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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
HILLCREST INVESTMENT COMPANY, L.L.C 
Plaintiff / Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20110322-CA 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT / APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)0) (West 2009). On April 15, 2011, the Utah Supreme 
Court transferred this action to this Court pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the integrated Right of Way Contract require the Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT) to build a frontage road as part of the consideration paid to the 
Horman Family Trusts who owned the property being purchased? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment (R. 171-72, 868-69) and was one of the bases of the district 
court's decision. R. 926. 
I 
\ 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for 
correctness, giving no deference to the district court's decision. Summary judgment is 
appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, 2001 UT 25, f32, 21 P.3d 198. 
2. Hillcrest Investment Co. purchased the Horman Family Trusts' remaining 
property some years after UDOT bought the three parcels of property it needed for the 
Legacy Parkway Project. Does Hillcrest have standing to sue UDOT for alleged breaches 
of UDOT's contract with the Horman Family Trusts? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment (R. 170, 867-68) and was one of the bases of the district court's 
decision. R. 924-25. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Same as for the First Issue. 
3. Did the district court err when it dismissed Hillcrest's unjust enrichment claim? 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW: This issue was raised in the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment (R. 174-76) and was one of the bases of the district court's 
decision. R. 929-30. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Same as for the First Issue. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no such statutes or rules. 
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. - - • . N'rATMiMriN'ror'j'HMCASE - •:-• • ,•: ..' - : 
In January 2002, UDOT purchased three pa ivc I *. o( Iain! )<-« n a group of family 
trusts referred to here as the Horman Family Trusts. R. 921-22. Thep iopnh wu in 
usedfoi tin l.t'gacy Parkway Project In November 2005, Hillcrest bought the Trusts' 
remaining property adjacent to i 
Hillcrest claimed that UDOT was contractually obli* UIIJC \u\ 
the property purchased from the Trusts. On December 1, 2008, Hillcrest 
filed this action a; *; ' uicrest alleged six causes of action, asking the 
court to either force UDOT to build the frontage i - ^ n^ *> \ * niiicrest tor 
1 failure to construct the road.1 
UDOT I ill Ml i< Mh.ii.Hi ibrsummaryjudgmenton August 3, 2010 R 164-231, SGO-
77, J "he court granted UDOT's motion 11 i\ 1 -11»• 11 .s " 111 I I '' I"' '» \ I iillcrest. filed its 
notice of appeal on April 4, 2011. R. 935-52. Hillcrest has not challen •:•*<• i 
of li'-i fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims. 
STATEMENT FACTS 
The following is a verbatim restatement pf the .firsI fniirlmi ai ilu»» sixjren 
paragraphs of undisputed facts as set out by the district court. R. 921-23. 
1
 The causes of action were for: breach of contract; declaratory judgment; specific 
performance; fraudulent inducement; negligent misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment. 
R 919-20 
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1. Sometime in the 1990's, UDOT announced plans for the construction of the 
Legacy Parkway Project < i 
2. In September 2001, following unsuccessful negotiations for the purchase of 
three (3) parcels of real property located west of Interstate 15 in Centerville, Utah for the 
Legacy Parkway Project, UDOT filed a condemnation action against the property's 
owners: the trustees of the Namroh Trust; the trustees of the Phares T. Horman Family 
Trust; the trustees of the SCV Horman Family Trust; and the trustees of the Theodore and 
Birdie Horman Family Trust (collectively, the "Horman Family Trusts"). 
3. Hillcrest was not a party to the condemnation action, and at the time of the 
condemnation action's filing, Hillcrest was not a record titleholder or lien holder of the 
Horman Family Trust's property, but had invested funds for the property's development 
as an industrial park. ^,^>^^^^^^^^i^ n 
4. As part qf the initial negotiations and settlement negotiations regarding the 
purchase of the three (3) parcels, UDOT made representations to the Horman Family 
Trusts and Centerville City that its plans for the Legacy Parkway Project would include 
the construction of a frontage road on the property. 
5. On November 8, 2001, UDOT made an offer to settle the condemnation action, 
which the Horman Family Trusts accepted. 
6. In January 2002, pursuant to the condemnation action's settlement, UDOT and 
the Horman Family Trusts entered Right of Way Contracts for the purchase of the three 
(3) parcels. 
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7. The Right of Way Contracts each contain an integration clause at f 5, which 
states: "The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The performance of 
this agreement constitutes the entire consideration for the grant of said tract of land and 
shall relieve [UDOTJ of all further obligations or claims on that account, or on account of 
the location, grade and construction of the proposed highway," 
8. The Right of Way Contracts do not contain any reference to an obligation for 
UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the property. 
9. The Right of Way Contracts each contain reference at f 6(A) to certain 
Warranty Deeds, which convey the three (3) parcels to UDOT. 
10. The referenced Warranty Deeds for one (1) of the three (3) parcels states in 
the property's legal description: "An undivided . . . interest in a parcel of land in fee for a 
frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway known as [the Legacy Parkway 
Project]." 
11. UDOT paid the Horman Family Trusts the agreed purchase price for the three 
(3) parcels. 
12. On November 21, 2005, Hillcrest entered a Real Estate Purchase Contract for 
the purchase of the Horman Family Trusts' remaining property located adjacent to the 
three (3) parcels previously purchased by UDOT as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. 
13. The Real Estate Purchase Contract contains the, following recital at ^ [4: 
"Whereas, [the Horman Family Trusts are] desirous of selling the Property at a 
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discounted price that properly reflects the difficulties [Hillcrest] will encounter in 
developing and selling the Property to independent third parties." 
14. Throughout 2006 and 2007, UDOT exchanged correspondence with Hillcrest 
and Centerville City regarding the construction of a frontage road on the property 
purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. Ultimately the frontage road was 
removed from the plans for the Legacy Parkway Project and the frontage road was not 
constructed. 
UDOT has agreed that Centerville City can build the frontage road after the 
necessary environmental clearances are obtained and an approved development plan is in 
place. R. 227-31. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Hillcrest's first three causes of action claim that UDOT breached its Right of Way 
Contract with the Horman Family Trusts. It is undisputed that UDOT paid the full 
contract price in exchange for receiving the three parcels of property. Hillcrest * s claims 
are based on its argument that the contract also required UDOT to build a frontage road. 
The integrated contract does not contain such a requirement. The unambiguous contract 
only required UDOT to "[p]ay cash in full to the grantor(s)" in exchange for warranty 
deeds to the three parcels of property. R. 181. -
Hillcrest's breach of contract claims arise from a contract between UDOT and the 
Horman Family Trusts. Hillcrest was not a party to the contract. Hillcrest was not in 
privity to a party to the contract. Hillcrest was not an identified third-party beneficiary of 
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that contract. The district court correctly held that Hillcrest did not have standing to sue 
UDOT for allegedly breaching the contract 
Hillcrest's sixth cause of action was for unjust enrichment. But a prerequisite of 
an unjust enrichment claim is the absence of an enforceable contract. Hillcrest has not 
denied that the Right of Way Contract is an enforceable contract. An unjust enrichment 
claim cannot be used to alter the contractual agreement because Hillcrest disagrees with 
the deal made by the Horman Family Trusts with UDOT. 
Hillcrest's fourth and fifth causes of action sounded in tort. They were dismissed 
because Hillcrest failed to file a notice of claim as required by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. R. 926-29. Hillcrest has not challenged the dismissal of these claims in 
its opening brief. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UDOT DID NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH THE 
HORMAN FAMILY TRUSTS 
Hillcrest claims that UDOT had a contractual obligation owed to the Horman 
Family Trusts, and Hillcrest, to build a frontage road; that UDOT breached this duty and 
should be required to either built the road or pay damages. Appellant's Brief at 21-34. 
The Right of Way Contract required UDOT to pay the Horman Family Trusts a 
total of $1,933,905.00 in exchange for Warranty Deeds for the three parcels of land 
sought by UDOT. R. 181. The money was due upon UDOT taking possession of the 
property. The contract contained an integration clause. 
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5. The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The 
performance of this agreement constitutes the entire consideration for the 
grant of said tract of land and shall relieve the Utah Department of • 
Transportation of all further obligations or claims on that account, or on 
account of the location, grade and construction of the proposed highway. 
Nothing in the Right of Way Contract requires that UDOT build a frontage road. 
Indeed the integration clause expressly relieves UDOT of any further obligations or 
claims based on how it completed the proposed highway project. The only consideration 
mentioned is a sum of money. The construction of a frontage road by UDOT was not 
listed as part of the consideration to be received by the Horman Family Trusts. 
"When a contract includes an integration clause, the contract is presumed to 
contain the whole agreement and parties may not rely on extrinsic evidence in attempting 
to prove that the contract is not integrated." City of Grantsville v. Redev. Agency of 
Tooele City. 2010 UT 38,^24, 233 P.3d 461. Hillcrest does not claim that the contract 
was not integrated. Instead, Hillcrest claims the contract is facially ambiguous as to 
whether UDOT was obligated to build a frontage road. 
In arguing that the contract is ambiguous, Hillcrest relies on Daines v. Vincent, 
2008 UT 51, 190 P.3d 1269, and Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Associates, 907 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1995). Each case permits the use of extrinsic evidence to give meaning to 
ambiguous terms, or to provide evidence that the parties gave a different meaning to a 
particular phrase or term. But neither case permits a party to alter the actual terms of the 
contract, or to add new terms, based on extrinsic evidence. 
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In articulating the Ward rule, we sought to establish a balanced, 
"better-reasoned" approach to an analysis of facial ambiguity that would 
allow judges to "consider the writing in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances." Id. However, we did not intend that a judge allow 
surrounding circumstances to create ambiguity where the language of a 
contract would not otherwise permit. In other words, our statement that 
"[rjational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all 
credible evidence," id. (internal quotation marks omitted), does not create a 
preference for that evidence over the language of the contract. See Saleh v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch.. 2006 UT 20. Tf 17. 133 P.3d 428 (stating that alternative 
interpretations of contractual language must be supported by the usual and 
natural meaning of the language used). Thus, under Ward, a finding of 
ambiguity after a review of relevant, extrinsic evidence is appropriate only 
when "reasonably supported by the language of the contract." 
Daines, 2008 UT 51 at f27. 
Hillcrest has not identified any term in the Right of Way Contract that it claims is 
ambiguous. Instead, Hillcrest argues that the mention of the warranty deeds for the three 
parcels of land in the contract creates an ambiguity. Namely, the deed related to one of 
the three parcels states that UDOT was being given the "parcel of land in fee for a 
frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway." R. 185. Hillcrest claims this 
showed that part of the consideration to be provided to the Horman Family Trusts for the 
sale of their property was the construction of the frontage road. The Right of Way 
Contract does not mention any such consideration. The only mention of the deeds in the 
Contract is in the provision stating that UDOT would: 
Pay Cash in full to the grantor(s) for the following: 
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:A 
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173 
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:C 
R. 1.81,1J6A,-
9 
The Warranty Deeds are referenced for the limited purpose of providing the legal 
description of the land being purchased by the Right of Way Contract. UDOT paid cash 
for the land described in the deeds. This was the only reference to the deeds in the 
contract. \%./L:.-= .-/-•.. 
This is not the kind of ambiguity that Daines and Ward considered. 
While the Ward rule allows for the admission of extrinsic evidence 
to uncover ambiguity, a finding of ambiguity will prove to be the exception 
and not the rule. Our holding in Ward provides for instances, though rare, 
where contractual terms are subject to alternative interpretations based on 
usage. For instance, to an American, the term "boot" refers to something 
you wear on your foot, but a person from Britain or New Zealand might 
refer to a "boot" as the storage area in the back of a car - what Americans 
, would refer to as a "trunk." Likewise, in America, we get "braces" to 
straighten our teeth, whereas the British use them to hold up their pants. 
When contracting parties have a contrasting understanding of express terms ; 
due to usage, the Ward rule provides the court with the ability to "place 
itself in the same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time i 
of contracting." Ward, 907 P.2d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Daines, 2008 UT 51 at P 0 n.5. 
Hillcrest asks this Court to add a new provision to the Right of Way Contract, not 
to address possible alternative interpretations of the terms used. The warranty deed in 
question only states the transportation purpose for which the property was being sought, a 
frontage road. UDOT can only condemn private property for transportation purposes. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-103(1) (West 2004). Transportation purposes are defined by 
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-102 (West 2004). The deeds for the other parcels of 
property expressly state they are being given to UDOT, in fee, for the purposes of 
building a freeway (R. 183) and "for a utility corridor incident to the construction of a 
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freeway," R. 187. The recitation of the transportation purpose for which the parcels of 
property were sought does not affect the contract's clear statement of the consideration to 
bepaid. 
None of the deeds contains a covenant running with the land that is enforceable by 
the Horman Family Trusts or Hillcrest. The deeds gave the land in fee to UDOT. There 
is no restrictive covenant that retains a right in the grantors to a frontage road or any other 
continuing right in the three parcels of property. 
Where expressly stated, restrictive covenants are not favored in the 
law and are strictly construed in favor of the free and unrestricted use of 
property. Generally, express restrictive covenants are upheld only "where 
they are necessary for the protection of the business for the benefit of which 
the covenant was made and no greater restraint is imposed than is 
reasonably necessary to secure such protection." Under certain extreme 
circumstances, a restrictive covenant may arise by implication from the 
language of a deed or lease or from the conduct of the parties. As a general 
rule, however, implied covenants are not favored in the law. In order for a 
restrictive covenant to be implied, the support for it must be "plain and 
unmistakable" or it must be "necessary" as a matter of law. 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 1991). 
There is no "plain and unmistakable" support for the creation of a restrictive 
covenant in the warranty deed. UDOT obtained fee simple ownership of the parcels of 
property that it bought. The integration clause states that UDOT was relieved from all 
other obligations and claims related to the construction of the proposed highway project. 
If changing circumstances led to the decision not to build the freeway, that would not 
violate any right of the Horman Family Trusts or Hillcrest. If the purchased parcel was 
not used for a utility corridor it would not violate any right of the Horman Family Trusts 
II 
or Hillcrest. The same is true of the changed circumstances that led UDOT to alter its 
plans for the construction of the Legacy Parkway Project and leave the construction of the 
frontage road to Centerville City. 
IL HILLCREST HAS NO STANDING TO SUE FOR BREACH OF 
UDOT'S CONTRACT WITH THE HORMAN FAMILY TRUSTS 
Hillcrest was not a party to the contract between the Horman Family Trusts and 
UDOT. Indeed, Hillcrest purchased the Trusts' remaining property "at a discounted price 
that properly reflects the difficulties [Hillcrest] will encounter in developing and selling 
the Property to independent third parties." R. 719 (Real Estate Purchase Contract). The 
district court properly held that Hillcrest did not have standing to enforce UDOT's 
contract with the Horman Family Trusts. 
"It is axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a 
contract." Shire Dev. v. Frontier Inv., 799 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting 
Wing v.Martin, 688 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Idaho 1984)). Only the parties to a contract, and 
their intended beneficiaries, have standing to sue on a contract. Id at 222-23. In Shire, 
joint venturers of a contracting party brought an action on the contract. Where the 
plaintiffs were neither parties to the contract, nor assignees of the contract they lacked 
standing to sue on the contract. 
Hillcrest claims that it is the assignee of the Horman Family Trusts because of the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract. R. 719-24. But the contract does not claim to assign any 
rights in prior contracts to Hillcrest. 'This court has made clear that assignments of 
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interest in property should be stated in the contract with specificity, including the usual 
words of assignment such as 'assumes,' 'agrees to pay,' 'assigns,' 'transfers' or 
'conveys.'" Shire Dev., 799 P.2d at 223. No such specific assignment of any rights in 
the Right of Way Contract was made. 
Nor does Hillcrest's claim that it was a beneficiary of one of the Horman Family 
Trusts (Appellant's Brief at 36) make it a beneficiary of the Right of Way Contract. To 
be a third-party beneficiary of that contract, Hillcrest must prove that the contracting 
parties clearly intended to confer "a separate and distinct benefit on Hillcrest." Wagner v. 
Clifton, 2002 UT 109, %11, 62 P.3d 440 (citation omitted). Such an intent must be found 
in the written contract. IcL 
Hillcrest is not mentioned in the Right of Way Contract. No one is mentioned 
other than the parties. Nothing in the contract gave Hillcrest standing to bring this action. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED 
HILLCREST'S UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM 
Hillcrest seeks relief from UDOT under the Right of Way Contract that it made 
with the Horman Family Trusts. But Hillcrest also asks this Court to award damages for 
unjust enrichment. An unjust enrichment claim cannot be made where a valid contract 
exists. "[A] prerequisite for recovery on an unjust enrichment theory is the absence of an 
enforceable contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties relating to the 
conduct at issue." Ashbv v. Ashby. 2010 UT 7, If 14, 227 P.3d 246 (unjust enrichment 
claims presuppose that no written or oral contract exists). 
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A claim of unjust enrichment cannot be used to enforce the Right of Way Contract. 
Unjust enrichment cannot be used to reform a contract. In Dalton v. Jerico Construction 
Co.. 642 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982), a subcontractor claimed that his contract was unfair and 
that he was entitled to extra compensation. The subcontractor argued that the theory of 
unjust enrichment should be applied. The Court rejected this argument because the 
contract, and not the theory of unjust enrichment, controlled. IcL at 750. "[I]t is not for a 
court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the 
bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable principles." IdL Hillcrest cannot 
change the terms of the Right of Way Contract using the theory of unjust enrichment. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly held that: UDOT had not breached its contract with the 
Horman Family Trusts; Hillcrest did not have standing to bring this action; and, an unjust 
enrichment claim cannot be raised where an enforceable contract exists. The dismissal of 
this action should be affirmed on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this /H* day of November, 2011. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ADDENDUM "A 
- 8 2011 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SECOND 
FARMNGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
HILLCREST INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 080700723 
Judge John R. Morris 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The 
Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their supporting and 
supplemental materials, and the Court's case file. The Court also held a hearing on the mat-
ter on December 27, 2010. Having considered all of the arguments, being fully advised in 
the premises, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion. 
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff Hillcrest Investment Company, LLC ("Hillcrest") initiated this action on 
December 1, 2008, filing a complaint against Defendant Utah Department of Transporta-
tion ("UDOT") that alleged six (6) causes of action: (1) breach of contract regarding 
UDOT's failure to construct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of 
the Legacy Parkway Project; (2) declaratory judgment regarding UDOT's obligation to con-
struct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway 
Project; (3) specific performance requiring UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road 
on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project; (4) fraudulent in-
ducement pertaining to UDOT's representations that it would pay for and construct a fron-
tage road on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project; (5) neg-
ligent misrepresentation pertaining to UDOT's representations that it would pay for and 
construct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway 
Ruling and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Case No. 080700723 
Project; and (6) unjust enrichment for the reduced purchase price and severance damages 
conferred on UDOT for its purchase of certain real property as part of the Legacy Parkway 
Project. On December 18, 2008, UDOT filed its answer to Hillcrest's complaint denying 
liability. 
On August 3, 2010, UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dis-
missal on each of Hillcrest's claims. Specifically, UDOT argues that Hillcrest's contract 
claims are barred as Hillcrest lacks any contractual privity with UDOT and because UDOT 
was not obligated to pay for and construct a frontage road as part of its purchase of the 
property for the Legacy Parkway Project, that Hillcrest's fraud and misrepresentation claims 
are barred by Hillcrest's failure:'to file a notice of claim in compliance with the Governmen-
tal Immunity Act of Utah; and that Hillcrest's unjust enrichment claim fails as a benefit was 
not conferred upon UDOT for which UDOT did not provide compensation. 
Hillcrest filed its memorandum in opposition to UDOT's motion on September 10, 
2010. In its opposition, Hillcrest argues that as a beneficial part-owner of the property at the 
time of UDOT's purchase, Hillcrest was in privity of contract with UDOT, and that lan-
guage within the warranty deeds that conveyed the property to UDOT obligated UDOT to 
pay for and construct a frontage road on the property as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. 
Hillcrest further argues that it complied with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah's no-
tice of claim requirement as UDOT had actual notice of Hillcrest's claims. Finally, Hillaest 
argues that equity necessitates recovery for the reduced purchase price and severance dam-
ages that UDOT received when it purchased the subject properties after representing that it 
would pay for and construct a frontage road on the property. 
On September 29, 2010, UDOT filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion 
for summary judgment reasserting its prior arguments. That same day, UDOT also filed a 
request to submit its motion for decision. 
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On December 27, 2010, the Court held a hearing on UDOTs motion for summary 
judgment.1 At the hearing, the Court ruled that it would overlook the technical defects in 
the parties' pleadings as the issues are relatively straightforward, neither party would be 
prejudiced, and because judicial economy favored a determination on the motion's merits 
rather than its mere refiling and rebriefing. Following argument by the parties, the Court 
took the matter under advisement. Accordingly, the Court finds that briefing on UDOT's 
motion for summary judgment is complete and that the matter is now ripe for determina-
tion. 
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Sometime in the 1990's, UDOT announced plans for the construction of the 
Legacy Parkway Project. 
2. In September 2001, following unsuccessful negotiations for the purchase of 
three (3) parcels of real property located west of Interstate 15 in Centerville, Utah for the 
Legacy Parkway Project, UDOT filed a condemnation action against the property's owners: 
the trustees of die Namroh Trust; the trustees of the Phares T. Horman Family Trust; the 
trustees of the SCV Horman Family Trust; and the trustees of the Theodore and Birdie 
Horman Family Trust (collectively, the "Horman Family Trusts"). 
3. Hillcrest was not a party to the condemnation action, and at the time of the 
condemnation action's filing, Hillcrest was not a record titleholder or lien holder of the 
Also pending at the hearing were Hillcrest's motion to strike portions of UDOT's reply memoran-
dum and Hillcrest's motion to reconsider the Court's order denying Hillcrest's ex parte motion to file 
overlength opposition memorandum. 
2 
Hillcrest argued in its opposing memorandum that denial of UDOTs motion is appropriate due to 
UDOT's failure to separately number its statement of undisputed facts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
7(c)(3)(A). Additionally, the Court rejected Hillcrest's request to file an overlength opposition me-
morandum and Hillcrest failed to subsequently file an opposition memorandum of appropriate 
length See Id. at 7(c)(2). 
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Horman Family Trusts' property, but had invested funds for the property's development as 
an industrial park.: 
4. As part of the initial negotiations and settlement negotiations regarding the pur-
chase of the three (3) parcels, IJDOT made representations to the Horman Family Trusts 
and Centerville City that its plans for the Legacy Parkway Project would include the con-
struction of a frontage road on the property. 
5. On November 8, 2001, UDOT made an offer to settle the condemnation action, 
which the Horman Family Trusts accepted. 
6. In January 2002, pursuant to the condemnation action's settlement, UDOT and 
the Horman Family Trusts entered Right of Way Contracts for the purchase of the three (3) 
parcels. 
7. The Right of Way Contracts each contain an integration clause at 1f5, which 
states: "The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The performance of this 
agreement constitutes the entire consideration for the grant of said tract of land and shall 
relieve [UDOT] of all ft^ on that account, or on account of the lo-
cation, grade and construction of the proposed highway." 
8. The Right of Way Contracts do not contain any reference to an obligation for 
UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the property. 
9. The Right of Way Contracts each contain reference at H6(A) to certain Warran-
ty Deeds, which conveyed the three (3) parcels to UDOT. 
10. The referenced Warranty Deeds for one (1) of the three (3) parcels states in the 
property's legal description: "An undivided ... interest in a parcel of land in fee for a fron-
tage road incident to the construction of a freeway known as [the Legacy Parkway 
Project]." 
11. UDOT paid the Horman Family Trusts the agreed purchase price for the three 
(3) parcels. 
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12. On November 21, 2005, Hillcrest entered a Real Estate Purchase Contract for 
the purchase of the Horman Family Trusts1 remaining property located adjacent to the three 
(3) parcels previously purchased by UDOT as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. 
13. The Real Estate Purchase Contract contains the following recital at 1f4: "Whe-
reas, [the Horman Family Trusts are] desirous of selling the Property at a discounted price 
that properly reflects the difficulties [Hillcrest] will encounter in developing and selling the 
Property to independent third parties." 
14. Throughout 2006 and 2007, UDOT exchanged correspondence with Hillcrest 
and Centerville City regarding the construction of a frontage road on the property purchased 
as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. Ultimately the frontage road was removed from the 
plans for the Legacy Parkway Project and the frontage road was not constructed. 
15. On October 28, 2008, Hillcrest delivered a letter to UDOT's executive director 
regarding Hillcrest's claims, which attached a draft of Hillcrest's complaint in this action; 
however, Hillcrest did not deliver a notice of its claims to the agent that UDOT has autho-
rized to receive notices of claims against UDOT or the Office of the Attorney General prior 
to initiating this action. 
16. Hillcrest commenced this action on December 1, 2008. 
ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to in-
terrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entided to a judgment 
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ, P. 56(c). "Because disposition of a case on summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact, 
including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved 
in favor of the opposing party." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., ISO P.2d 827, 831 
(Utah 1989). 
Here, UDOT seeks summary dismissal on each of Hillcrest's claims. 
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Hillcrest's Contract Claims Against UDOT (Breach of Contract, Declaratory Judgment, 
and Specific Performance) 
In order to survive summary dismissal of its breach of contract claim and contract 
related claims, Hillcrest must show some evidence that a contract existed, that Hillcrest per-
formed its obligations under the contract, that UDOT failed to perform under the contract, 
and that Hillcrest was damaged by UDOTs failure to perform. See Bair v. Axiom Design, 
L.L.C., 2001 UT 20, Tfl4, 20 P.3d 388. UDOT contends that Hillcrest was not party to, or in 
privity of, any contract with UDOT, and that even if a contract or privity exists, UDOT ful-
ly performed, as it was not obligated to construct a frontage road on the property purchased 
from the Horman Family Trusts as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. 
'"As a general rule, none is liable upon a contract except those who are parties to 
iV" Shire Dev.v.Frontier-Invs.,199 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah Ct App. 1990) (quoting County of 
Clark v. Bonanza No. / r 615 P.2d 939, 943 (Nev. 1980)). "Tt is axiomatic in the law of con-
tract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a contract.,,, Id. (quoting Wing v. Martin, 688 
P.2d 1172, 1177 (Idaho 1984)). Accordingly, "only parties to a contract, or intended benefi-
ciaries thereof, have standing to sue [on a contract]." Id. at 222-23.3 
Here, it is undisputed that Hillcrest was not a record titleholder of the properties 
UDOT purchased from the Horman Family Trusts for the Legacy Parkway Project, was not 
party to UDOTs condemnation action against the Horman Family Trusts, was not a party 
"Third-party beneficiaries are persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights created in 
them by a contract to which they are not parties and for which they give no consideration." SME 
Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, f!7, 28 P.3d 669 (Internal 
quotations omitted). "The existence of third party beneficiary status is determined by examining a 
written contract." Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, \U, 62 P.3d 440 (Internal quotations omitted). 
"The written contract must show that the contracting parties clearly intended to confer a separate 
and distinct benefit upon the third party." Id. (Internal quotations omitted). "Indeed, [the Utah Su-
preme Court] has stated that it is not enough that the parties to the contract know, expect or even 
intend that others will benefit from the [contract].... The contract must be undertaken for the plain-
tiffs direct benefit and the contract itself must affirmatively make this intention clear." SME Indus., 
Inc., 2001 UT 54, $47 (Internal quotations omitted). 
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to the Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts, and did not 
purchase the Horman Family Trusts' remaining adjacent property until several years after 
UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts entered the Right of Way Contracts. Additionally, 
the clear and unambiguous language within the Right of Way Contracts and Warranty 
Deeds conveying the purchased property from the Horman Family Trusts to UDOT contain 
no reference to Hillcrest or any other potential third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, given 
these facts and the plain language of the Right of Way Contracts and Warranty Deeds, the 
Court must conclude as a matter of law that Hillcrest does not have standing to sue UDOT 
on its contract claims, as Hillcrest was not a party to, or in privity of, UDOT's contracts 
with the Horman Family Trusts.4 
Moreover, even if Hillcrest was a party to, or in privity of, UDOT's contracts with 
the Horman Family Trusts, the Court finds that UDOT was not obligated to pay for and 
construct a frontage road on the property purchased from the Horman Family Trusts for the 
Legacy Parkway Project. Specifically, UDOT's Right of Way Contracts with the Horman 
Family Trusts contain a clear and unambiguous integration clause that indicates the docu-
ment sets forth the parties' entire agreement. (See Right of Way Contracts, 1f5).5 The Right 
of Way Contracts do not contain any reference to an affirmative or executory obligation of 
UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the purchased property. (See generally 
The fact that Hillcrest invested funds for the development of the Horman Family Trusts' property 
prior to UDOT's purchase of the property for the Legacy Parkway Project and subsequently pur-
chased the Horman Family Trusts' remaining adjacent property is insufficient to demonstrate that 
Hillcrest was in privity of contract or an intended third-party beneficiary of the contracts between 
UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts. Further, Hillcrest has failed to present sufficient competent 
evidence that it was a beneficiary of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family Trusts, that the 
Horman Family Trusts have assigned to Hillcrest any claims they may have against UDOT, or any 
other evidence to establish a privity relationship with the Horman Family Trusts or UDOT. 
"An integrated agreement is defined as a writing ... constituting a final expression of one or more 
terms of an agreement. When a contract includes an integration clause, the contract is presumed to 
contain the whole agreement and parties may not rely on extrinsic evidence in attempting to prove 
that the contract is not integrated." City ofGrantsvillev.Redev. Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38, ^24, 
233 P.3d 461 (Internal citations omitted). 
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Id.). Further, while the Right of Way Contracts specifically reference the Warranty Deeds 
that conveyed the purchased property from the Horman Family Trusts to UDOT, and the 
property's legal description within the Warranty Deeds refers to a general purpose "for a 
frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway known as [the Legacy Parkway 
Project,]" the Court finds that this language does not modify the parties' obligations set 
forth in the Right of Way Contracts and does not create an additional obligation on the part 
of UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the purchased property. (See Id. at 
116(A); see also Warranty Deeds). Rather, the plain language of the Warranty Deeds merely 
reflects that the purchased property may be used for a frontage road incident to the Legacy 
Parkway Project. (See Warranty Deeds). Accordingly, despite any representations made by 
UDOT during initial negotiations and settlement negotiations with the Horman Family 
Trusts, and subsequent correspondence with Hillcrest and Centerville City, the Court must 
conclude as a matter of law that UDOT was not contractually obligated to pay for and con-
struct a frontage road on the property that it purchased from the Horman Family Trusts as 
part of the Legacy Parkway Project. The Court, therefore, GRANTS UDOT's motion for 
summary judgment as to Hillcrest's claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and 
specific performance. 
Hillcrest's Fraudulent Inducement and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims 
Hillcrest alleges that UDOT fraudulently induced settlement of its condemnation ac-
tion against the Horman Family Trusts by representing that it would pay for and construct a 
frontage road on the property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. Hillcrest 
further alleges that UDOT negligently misrepresented its intent and commitment to con-
struct the frontage road as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. 
"The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, establishes the parameters under which 
parties may bring suit against governmental entities for injuries." Greene v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 2001 UT 109, flO, 37 P.3d 1156. "Utah law mandates strict compliance with the re-
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quirements of the Immunity Act." Id. at 1fl2. Relevant to this case, the Act provides that a 
notice of claim must be filed prior to the initiation of court action: 
"Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its em-
ployee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the em-
ployee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regard-
less or whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as govern-
mental" 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(2) (Emphasis added). The Act further provides that "[t]he no-
tice of claim shall be ... directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the require-
ments of Section68-3-8.5to the office of: ... (E) the attorney general, when the claim is 
against the state; ... or (G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the no-
tice of claim by the governmental entity under Subsection (5)(e)." Id. at § 63G-7-
401(3)(b)(ii)(E) & (G).6 
"'The primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to afford the responsible 
public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of 
a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure 
of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.'" Brittain v. State by & through Utah 
DepXcfEmployme 671 (Utah Ct. App- 1994) (quoting Stahl v. Utah 
TramitAuth.i6l%¥2&m^ "Furthermore, filing notice of claim tends to 
minimize the difficulties that may arise due to changes in administrations... [and] protects 
against the passage of time obscuring memory and distorting a plaintiffs recollection of the 
events which are at the heart of the claim." Id. (Internal citations omitted). Accordingly, 
"the [Utah] supreme court has held the statutory notice requirement is a jurisdictional re-
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-40l(5)(a) and (e): "Each governmental entity subject to suit 
under [the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah] shall file a statement with the Division of Corpora-
tions and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce ... [and] may, in its statement, 
identify an agent authorized by the entity to accept notices of claim on its behalf." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-7-401(5)(a) & (e). UDOT has identified Shelley Exeter as its authorized agent to accept notic-
es of claim on its behalf. 
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quirement and a precondition to suit"Lamarr v. Utah State Dep'tofTransp., 828 P.2d 535, 
540 (Utah Ct App. 1992) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988)). 
Here, it is undisputed that Hillaest did not deliver a notice of its claims against 
UDOT to the Office of the Attorney General or the agent that UDOT has authorized to re-
ceive notices of claim prior to initiating this action. Further, while UDOT had actual notice 
of Hillcrest's claims prior to the filing of Hillcrest's complaint by virtue of the October 28, 
2008 letter Hillcrest delivered to UDOT's executive director, "the [Utah] supreme court has 
indicated that actual notice cannot cure a failure to comply with the notice provisions of the 
GovernmentalImmunity Act" Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 541 (citing Varoz v. Sevey\ 506 P.2d435, 
436 (Utah 1973)). Accordingly, the Court must conclude that it is without jurisdiction to 
hear Hillcrest'sfraudulent inducement arid negligent misrepresentation claims against 
UDOT. 
Additionally, even if Hillcrest had strictly cori^lied with the notice of claim require-
ment of the Governmental ImmunityAct of Utah,Hillcresfs claims for fraudulent induce-
ment and negjigent misrepresentation are fundamental Hillcrest's 
complaint alleges that it sold property to UDOT at a reduced cost based upon UDOT's re-
presentations that it would pay for and construct a frontage road across the purchased prop-
erty as part of the Legacy Parkway Project, (See Complaint, iffl45-60). However, Hillcrest 
did not convey any property to UDOT tosupport these allegations. Rather, the undisputed 
facts show that Hillcrest was not a record tideholder of the property that UDOT purchased 
from the Horman Family Trusts and was not a party to UDOT's condemnation action 
against the Horman Family Trusts.7 Moreover, the Court has found that Hillcrest was not 
Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Hillcrest purchased the Horman Family Trusts' re-
maining adjacent property several years after UDOT purchased the property for the Legacy Parkway 
Project from the Horman Family Trusts. {See Real Estate Purchase Contract). At the time of this 
purchase, it was uncertain whether a frontage road would be included in UDOT's plans for the Leg-
acy Parkway Project. In fact, Hillaest purchased the remaining adjacent property at a discounted 
price, which reflected the difficulties Hillcrest would encounter in developing and selling the proper-
ty to independent third parties. (See Id. at Recital ^i). 
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party to the Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts, was 
not in privity of contract or an intended third-party beneficiary of the Right of Way Con-
tracts, and that Hillcrest has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that it was a bene-
ficiary of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family Trusts, or that the Horman Family 
Trusts assigned Hillcrest any claims that they may have against UDOT. Accordingly, given 
the undisputed facts in this matter and the Court's rulings on Hillcrest's contract related 
claims, the Court must conclude as a matter of law that Hillcrest cannot succeed on its frau-
dulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court, therefore, GRANTS 
UDOT's motion for summary judgment as to Hillcrest's claims for fraudulent inducement 
and negligent misrepresentation. 
Hillcrest's Unjust Enrichment Claim 
Hillcrest complains that UDOT has been unjustly enriched and that equity necessi-
tates recovery for the reduced purchase price and severance damages that UDOT received 
when it purchased the property from the Horman Family Trusts upon representing that it 
would pay for and construct a frontage road on the property. 
"A claim for unjust enrichment is an action brought in restitution, and a prerequisite 
for recovery on an unjust enrichment theory is the absence of an enforceable contract go-
verning the rights and obligations of the parties relating to the conduct at issue." Ashby v. 
Ashby, 2010 UT 7,1fl4, 227 P.3d 246. "If there were a contract, it, rather than the law of res-
titution, would govern the parties' rights and determine their recovery." Id. "Recovery un-
der [unjust enrichment] presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists." Id. 
(Internal quotations omitted). 
Here, the Court has found that no enforceable contract exists between Hillcrest and 
UDOT. Nevertheless, to succeed on its claim for unjust enrichment, Hillcrest must establish 
three elements: 
"First, there must be a benefit conferred by one person on another. Second the 
conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Third, there must 
be acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circums-
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tances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without 
payment of its value." 
Allen v. Hall, 2006 UT 70, 1f26, 148 P.3d 939. It is undisputed that Hillcrest was never a 
record tMeholder of the property UDOT purchased from the Herman Family Trusts as part 
of the Legacy Parkway Project, and that Hillcrest did riot purchase the Horman Family 
Trusts' remaining adjacent property until several years after UDOT and the Horman Family 
Trusts entered the Right of Way Contracts. Under these facts, the Court cannot find that 
Hillcrest ever conferred a benefit on UDOT to support Hillcrest's claim for unjust enrich-
ment. Additionally, Hillcrest has presented no evidence to establish that it was a beneficiary 
of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family Trusts, or that the Horman Family Trusts 
have assigned to Hillcrest any claims they may have against UDOT. Regardless, however, 
the Court has found that the Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman 
Family Trusts do not contain any affirmative or executory obligation for UDOT to pay for 
and construct a frontage road on the property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway 
Project. Accordingly, the Court must conclude as a matter of law that UDOT did not re-
ceive a benefit for which it did not compensate the Horman Family Trusts upon its perfor-
mance under the Right of Way Contracts. The Court, therefore, GRANTS UDOT's motion 
for summary judgment as to Hillcrest1 s unjust enrichment claim. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts 
are fully integrated and contain the parties1 entire agreement. 
2. The Right of Way Contracts and Warranty Deeds between UDOT and the 
Horman Family Trusts are clear and unambiguous. 
3. Hillcrest does not have standing to assert its contract claims against UDOT, as 
Hillcrest was not a party to any contract with UDOT, and was not in privity of contract or 
an intended third-party beneficiary of UDOT's Right of Way Contracts with the Horman 
Family Trusts. 
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4. UDOT's Right of Way Contracts with the Horman Family Trusts do not con-
tain any obligation, executory or otherwise, requiring UDOT to pay for and construct a 
frontage road on the property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. 
5. The Warranty Deeds conveying the purchased property for the Legacy Park-
way Project from the Horman Family Trusts to UDOT do not modify UDOT's obligations 
under the Right of Way Contracts, and do not create an additional obligation for UDOT to 
pay for and construct a frontage road on the property. 
6. UDOT performed its obligations under the Right of Way Contracts with the 
Horman Family Trusts. 
7. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Hillcrest's fraudulent inducement and negli-
gent misrepresentation claims against UDOT, as Hillcrest failed to deliver the requisite no-
tice of claim in accordance with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. 
8. UDOT's actual notice of Hillcrest's claims prior to the filing of Hillcrest's com-
plaint does not cure Hillcrest's failure to comply with the notice of claim requirement of the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah. 
9. Even if Hillcrest had complied with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah's 
notice of claim requirement, Hillcrest was not the record tideholder of, and could not con-
vey, the property UDOT purchased from the Horman Family Trusts as part of the Legacy 
Parkway Project, and therefore, Hillcrest cannot establish the necessary elements to support 
its claims of fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation. 
10. Hillcrest did not confer a benefit upon UDOT for purposes of Hillcrest's unjust 
enrichment claim, and UDOT did not unjustly receive a benefit from the Horman Family 
Trusts, as UDOT was not obligated to pay for and construct a frontage road on the property 
purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that UDOT's motion for sum-
mary judgment is GRANTED. 
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IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that as a consequence of this ruling, all 
other pending motions are rendered moot. 
This Ruling shall also constitute the Court's Order in this matter; no separate order is 
necessary or required. 
Date signed: al/11 — • 
WW-
w 
Sggg.jS 
TRICT COURT JUDGE^ ,. , 
JOHN R. MORRIS * o / S T A ^ \ o 
^o ** — i» R o F , IN 
****»«**! 
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2-2000 RIGHT O^ WAY CONTRACT 
th .No . 70004 P P M S P i n N o . 1793 Region No, 2 
vet Name: Legacy Parkway - So. Davis Co. Parcel No. 173:A, 173i 173-C 
Project No. SP-0067(l)0 
te: 
The Namroh Trust, The Phares T Horman Family Trust, The SCV Honman Familty Trust, 
The Theodore & Birdie Horman Family Trust Grantor(s) of 
See Below Warranty deed(s) for a tract of land for transportation purposes over property described in said deed will be delivered to 
i J. West, SR/WA Acquisition Agent, as escrow agent, with instructions to deliver said deed(s) to the Utah Department of Transportation, 
48420, 4501 South 2700 West, 4* Floor South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8420, upon the delivery to said escrow agent, for the undersigned 
>r(s) of a copy of this agreement, properly executed and approved by the Utah Department of Transportation. 
IN CONSIDERATION of the foregoing, and other considerations hereinafter set forth it is mutually agreed by the parties hereto as 
s: 
1. Said tract of land is granted free and clear. All liens and encumbrances and partial releases for said tract of land shall be furnished to the Utah Department of 
Transportation, and the total amount in cash settlement shall be paid to the grantor except such portion thereof, as the grantor may assign to a lien holder in obtaining the 
lartial releases. 
2. All work done under this agreement, shall conform to all applicable building, fire and sanitary laws, ordinances and regulations relating to such work, and 
tall be done in a good and workmanlike manner. 
3. All structures, improvements, or other facilities when removed and relocated or reconstructed, shall be left in as good condition as found. 
4. No work, improvement, alteration or maintenance will be done cr rnade c>mer man or in addition to mat rjrovided in this agreement-
5. The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The performance of this agreement constitutes die entire consideration for the grant of said tract 
L* land and shall reueve the Utah Department of Transportation of all fiirther obligations or claims on that account, or on account of the location, grade and construction of 
ic proposed highway. 
6, If and when possession is taken by it of the said tract of land(s) hereinabove referred to, the Utah Department of 
>ortation shall comply with the following: 
int R, Horman, Rhys Horman & Kenneth Erickson, trustees of the NAMROH TRUST, 
und-23.445410% int) 
as T. Horman, Jr., Kevin Ride & Kenneth L. Spurlock, trustees of the PHARES TV HORMAN FAMILY 
JST (an und. 23.079810%) 
es H. Horman, trustee of the SCV HORMAN FAMILY TRUST; (an und. 30.139510%) 
is Horman, trustee of the THEODORE AND BIRDIE HORMAN FAMflLY TRUST; (an und. 
335270% int) 
y Cash in full to the grantor(s) for the following: 
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173: A 
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173 
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:C 
7. Grantor agrees to pay any and all taxes assessed against this property to date of closing. However 
ri'against t h e P r o p e r t y t o t h e d a t e o f c l o s i n g s h a l l n o t i n c l u d e any r o l l b a c k 
e i n l i e u f e e payments t h a t nay be r e q u i r e d , a s d e s c r i b e d Total Cash Settlement 
t'Code Ann. g 5 9 - 2 - 5 1 1 , A l l r o l l b a c k t a x e s and any o n e - t i m e i n l i e u f e e pa^fnoits s h a l l b e 
f u l l s o l e l y by t h e Utah Departirent o t T r a n s p o r t a t i o n . 
year first above 
,GRANT<WS) , 
$1,933,905.00 
a l l taxes 
taxes or any 
$1,933,905.00 
[N VyiTNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this agreeraeat the day and y written, ft is understood that this is only an option until 
y the Utah Department of Transportation. 
EPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
fed for Appcov; 
f02> t\ ^/\AJLXLSL^ , , ^\/^JL^JLl 
APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION ITEMS: _ . \ 
